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Although the views expressed by Doug Bland are his own and do not necessarily reflect the views of the CDA, we are, however, in agreement that a debate in the House at this stage would not serve the "public good." We would, on the other hand, recommend that the two committes of the House interested in this matter; ie: Defence and Foreign Affairs, undertake a review of the goals of the mission, whether these goals are in the long-term interest of Canada and what tools are best suited to achieve the goals.

The House of Commons is has neither the competence nor the resources to debate wisely or oversee effectively matters of national defence. More worrisome, members of parliament over the years have displayed little interest in this fundamental duties and there is no reason to believe this neglect will vanish despite the present political tempest over Canadian Forces deployments in Afghanistan.

The House can monitor, challenge, and oversee the government's defence polices and the actions and decisions of ministers and (indirectly) senior officer and defence officials in three ways. Question period allows members of parliament (and senators in that other place) to solicit information and challenge cabinet decisions. The well-recorded weaknesses of this instrument are exaggerated when opposition members of parliament pretend to ask informed, policy relevant questions and defence ministers pretend to answer them. No public good is served by this charade.

The Standing Committee on National Defence and Veterans Affairs is potentially a more useful instrument for overseeing the nation's defence. The reforms of the 1990s provide the opposition more leverage and control over committee agendas and opportunities for members to closely interrogate ministers, officers, and officials. In certain circumstances, the committee can receive classified information, but this allowance is rarely used simply because such information has little partisan utility to members of parliament. Some defence committees have accomplished a great deal, but they are all handicapped by a lack of expertise, research staffs, and experience. Witnesses, therefore, are often asked very broad questions that usually miss the essence of the issue on the table. Too often, committee meetings become mere partisan contests where expert witnesses are tempted by members to support or condemn government policies. Very little committee work is reported to the public or influences cabinet decisions.

Debates in the House of Commons are billed as the triumphal ceremony of parliamentary democracy. Grand rhetoric, statesman-like reasoned discourse, serious attention by every member of parliament to the crucial issues of the day are imagined. Sadly, debates on national defence, war and peace, and the welfare of members of the Canadian Forces are usually late night shows played before tiny assemblies of bored politicians compelled to their duty by whips not, by conscience. During the Liberal era, even as Canadian Forces fighter pilots were ordered to bomb Serbians, members engage mostly in "take-note debates," based on vague motions and ending without any votes. Liberal backbenchers typically read short speeches prepared by public servants and handed to them as they entered the chamber. In all cases, "party democracy" ruled.

Opposition members usually operated under the same party constraints, but without the benefit of publically supported researchers. Eventually, these forgettable debates delivered by individual members as irrelevant to national policy as the canned speeches they delivered sputtered out, unnoticed and little reported. In these circumstances a debate in the House of Commons on Canada’s present or future operations in Afghanistan seems pointless.

These irresponsible partisan habits, however, do not negate the principle that parliament has a duty to oversee the government's actions and decisions concerning national defence. They do, rather, highlight the need for a deep, self-appraisal within the House of Commons about how members of parliament are to fulfill their duty responsibly when Canadians, including diplomats and humanitarian workers, are on active service in dangerous circumstances.

In 1994 the Joint Committee of the Senate of Canada and the House of Commons recognized parliament's lack of attention to national defence and concluded: "Canada's defence policy is not simply a matter for the minister or for the thousands of dedicated men and women of the Canadian Forces. It requires the attention of Parliament and the Canadian people." The Somalia inquiry commissioners repeated the theme in 1997: "Civil control of the military [and of governments with authority over the military] does not occur invariably," but demands the attention of a "vigilant parliament." Yet there is still no "vigilant parliament." If there were, then why would members ask after the fact to debate whether Canada should be at war in Afghanistan?

Members of parliament demand debates and votes and a share of the Crown prerogative over national defence and then sit mute, uncomprehending of their responsibilities. Given this history, why should Canadians trust the House of Commons with the Canada's nation defence and the lives of members of the Canadian Forces?

The Conference of Defence Associations (CDA) is pleased to note that the Prime Minister, by visiting the Canadian military contingent in Kandahar, has shown in a tangible way that his Government is fully committed to theAfghan mission. While visiting Canada’s troops in Afghanistan, Prime Minister Stephen Harper stated that “cutting and running . . . It’s not my way. And it’s not the Canadian way” (see link to the Prime Minister’s speech below). The Prime Minister also said that Afghanistan was about “demonstrating an international leadership role for our country.”

In Could Canada Pull Out From Afghanistan? A “What If” Scenario (see full text below), General (Ret’d) Paul Manson, President CDA Institute, in an article recently published in the Ottawa Citizen, argues that withdrawing Canadian troops from Afghanistan would produce several negative consequences. First, Canada’s relations with the US and NATO would suffer. Second, the Taliban would be emboldened and increase their attacks on Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT) in Afghanistan. Third, the Karzai Government in Kabul would be dealt a severe blow. Fourth, the PRT process would be in jeopardy. Fifth, Canada would make itself a lucrative target for future terrorist attacks.

In the second paper, Is it Time to Cut and Run From Kandahar? (see full text below), Colonel (Ret’d) Brian MacDonald, newly appointed CDA Senior Defence Analyst, argues that the Canadian Forces in Afghanistan represent hope for a country that has long suffered from oppressive regimes and a poor standard of living. Colonel MacDonald states that through its “Three D” program, focusing on development, diplomacy, and defence, the Canadian Forces are helping stabilize and rebuild Afghanistan. He concludes by saying that “now is not the time for Canada to cut and run from Afghanistan.”

The increase in support from the general public for the Afghan mission is also encouraging. According to a poll conducted for CTV and The Globe and Mail, 55 percent of Canadians support the decision to send our troops to Afghanistan (see link below).

The CDA remains committed to the excellent work our soldiers are doing in Afghanistan. We hope that the Government of Canada and the general public will continue to support the mission. If you wish to indicate your support for the CF in Afghanistan, please write a letter to the editor of your local newspaper or to your Member of Parliament. MP's e-mail addresses adhere to this format: lastname.initial@parl.gc.ca. For example, to send an e-mail to Bill Graham, send the e-mail to graham.b@parl.gc.ca.

Canadians are uneasy about their nation’s 2300-strong military presence in Afghanistan. The anxiety seems to grow with every new casualty, whether caused by enemy action or traffic accidents in that war-torn land.

The concern is understandable. Afghanistan is a far-off land whose history is scarcely known here. We might associate that nation vaguely with ancient stories of the exotic Silk Road, or with the “Great Game” in which larger neighbours and colonial powers fought over this mountainous, landlocked country because of its strategic location.

Then there were the dreadful excesses of the Taliban regime, which unwisely (as it turned out) provided an operating base for Al Qaeda, leading to the regime’s forcible expulsion by the United States in the aftermath of the 9/11 outrage.

Canadians also know, by and large, that a new government under Hamid Karzai was democratically elected in 2004, and that it remains in office with the strong support of the United States, NATO and other allied nations.

Then there has been the recent reappearance of the Taliban, this time as an opposing terrorist force, supported by the warlords who control most of the regions of the country outside of the capital, Kabul, and funded largely by Afghanistan’s huge opium poppy industry, which provides 90% of Europe’s heroin.

And so Canada, in response to an urgent appeal from the Karzai Government, has joined the 30-nation NATO mission in an ambitious effort to rebuild the country through sixteen Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs), an undertaking which presupposes the establishment of a good measure of security in each area.

In a nutshell, then, this is the setting for the great national debate on Afghanistan. In reality, the situation is far more complex, Afghanistan being what it is – a remarkable and confusing mix of cultures, languages, geographies, and variations of the Islam religion.

In response to those who advocate withdrawal, the Government and its supporters on this issue are inclined to point out the positive aspects of our nation’s involvement in Afghanistan, such as the importance of helping that tortured nation find peace, freedom and prosperity after decades of warfare, as well as bringing fundamental human rights to its citizens (especially its women), providing schools for Afghan youth, security across the countryside, and water and electricity for the local population.

• There would be a serious impact on our relations with the United States. Our American friends in particular would see this as yet another example of Canada seeking the “free ride” and shirking its obligation to join in the struggle against global terrorism. An already shaky cross-border relationship would be set back severely, with negative implications for trade, travel restrictions and other dimensions of the Canada/US

• There would be damage to Canada’s status in NATO. Our European allies would be frankly appalled at the Canadian action, at a time when many of them are facing similar disquiet at home about their commitment to the reconstruction of Afghanistan. A withdrawal by Canada would be seen as a betrayal. Nations like the Netherlands, which only joined the international effort following a healthy and sometimes acrimonious

• The Taliban would see Canada’s backing out as a great victory. To have “defeated” our soldiers, whom they must know are top quality fighters, would be a triumph of the first order over the “infidel occupiers”. Indeed, the spate of attacks on the Canadian contingent which took place in the early days of the Kandahar operation seems to have been designed to intimidate the Canadian population. A successful outcome (from the Taliban perspective) would be a clear signal that terrorist attacks against PRT forces are working. This would likely be a stimulus for further such attacks.

• A Canadian withdrawal would be a blow to the fragile Karzai Government in Kabul, which in reality controls only the immediate area of the national capital. The loss of a key PRT would be seen as a sign of political weakness.

• The PRT process itself would be in considerable jeopardy. The Canadians are in Kandahar because they are very good at what they are doing, and Kandahar is the linchpin of the entire PRT program. Failure there could lead to withdrawal by other nations’ forces, and a general breakdown of the reconstruction program. The real victims in this scenario would be the people of Afghanistan, the great majority of whom desperately want peace, security, freedom and prosperity after so many years of hardship. A decision by Canada to renege on its commitment to them would be a sad blow.

• Finally, in showing such weakness in the face of fanatic terrorism, Canada will have made itself a lucrative target for future attacks. Will we talk some day about New York, London, Madrid, Bali and Vancouver?

All things considered, then, a decision by the new Conservative government to pull out now would be ill-advised, and it would be an unfortunate turning point in the history of our nation’s contribution to peace and security beyond our own borders.

The government will surely stay the course, as it must. There will be continuing criticism by those with narrower views. There will be more casualties. We will be in Afghanistan for the long haul. But it will be worth it, and Canadians will be able to hold their heads high for having contributed so well to the betterment of Afghanistan – and the world.

It was a Third World country, no doubt, with Third World incomes, and Third World public services, and great distortions of wealth and power—but a country which did have an educated middle class, and a government that did provide some public services, and which was not particularly oppressive by Third World standards.

And there was hope--hope for a future with economic growth, hope for increasing levels of education, hope for better health services, hope for a gradual move towards the political and democratic rights that we in the First World take so easily for granted.

Then came the overthrow of the Afghan government, the Soviet invasion of 1979, and the installation of a Stalinist puppet regime of a cruelly repressive and barbarous nature, followed by the rise of a brave and defiant movement of Afghan Freedom Fighters determined to regain their country.

The war against the Soviet invaders and their puppet administration, though ultimately successful, left the country in ruins—with much of the arable land rendered unusable by the 15,000,000 mines scattered by the Soviet invaders, including the small “butterfly” mines

Next came the era of the warlords, the regional barons whose power came out the barrel of the guns which they employed so freely to protect the revenues that came from the opium poppies and the drug trade, and what little economic infrastructure had remained from the resistance to the Soviets crumbled further.

The emergence of the Taliban from its roots in the socially and religiously conservative south seemed, at first, to be a tiny flame of hope that would mark the end of the oppression of the warlords, and the beginnings of economic recovery and social stability.

Sadly, it was not to be. The new Taliban government imposed a brutally repressive regime of its own, one devoted to imposing the harsh customs of an adamantly fundamentalist sect of Sunni Islam on all the citizens of Afghanistan.

Theirs was a regime devoted to preventing little girls from going to school, devoted to sending their mothers back under the burkha, to destroying the symbols of other religions such as the great Buddhist statues carved out of the living rock at Bamiyan, which had stood for centuries as one of the wonders of the world.

It also led to an economy even more devastated than at the end of the Soviet invasion, and to the fearful prospect of the return of the warlords, the return of the opium poppies, and the extinction of that tiny flame of hope that had flickered so briefly.

The Canadian International Development Agency, with the partnership of the Canadian Departments of Foreign Affairs and National Defence—the “Three Ds” of Development, Diplomacy, and Defence—has funded programmes to help the new Afghan government collect and store 10,000 heavy weapons such as artillery, tanks, and rocket launchers, programmes to help with de-mining and the destruction of ammunition stockpiles, programmes to provide savings and micro-loan services to 140,000 clients, 89 percent of them women.

With our NATO partners in the International Security Assistance Force, Canadians have helped the Afghan government and the Afghan people to develop a new constitution; helped them to conduct successful presidential and legislative elections; helped to get more than one million girls enrolled in school; helped them to begin reforms in defence, justice, and finance; and helped them begin the reintegration of nearly three million Afghan refugees.

And the role of the Canadian Forces in Afghanistan is to protect that work, by the use of deadly force if necessary, against those who would seek kill the civilians, the Afghans, the Canadians, and our other partners, who are engaged in the reconstruction of Afghanistan—to protect against those who would destroy all that we have achieved, and turn back the clock to the oppressions of earlier regimes.

For without the protection provided by Canadian soldiers, willing to give their lives to protect the work of the diplomats and development teams, that work will end, and that tiny flame of hope in Afghanistan will go out.